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Abstract. Trust models are widely used in various computer science disciplines.
The primary purpose of a trust model is to continuously measure the trustworthi-
ness of a set of entities based on their behaviors. In this article, the novel notion
of rational trust modeling is introduced by bridging trust management and game
theory. Note that trust models/reputation systems have been used in game theory
(e.g., repeated games) for a long time, however, game theory has not been utilized
in the process of trust model construction; this is the novelty of our approach. In
our proposed setting, the designer of a trust model assumes that the players who
intend to utilize the model are rational/selfish, i.e., they decide to become trust-
worthy or untrustworthy based on the utility that they can gain. In other words,
the players are incentivized (or penalized) by the model itself to act properly. The
problem of trust management can be then approached by game theoretical anal-
yses and solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. Although rationality might
be built-in in some existing trust models, we intend to formalize the notion of
rational trust modeling from the designer’s perspective. This approach will result
in two fascinating outcomes. First of all, the designer of a trust model can incen-
tivize trustworthiness in the first place by incorporating proper parameters into
the trust function, which can be later utilized among selfish players in strategic
trust-based interactions (e.g., e-commerce scenarios). Furthermore, using a ratio-
nal trust model, we can prevent many well-known attacks on trust models. These
two prominent properties also help us to predict the behavior of the players in
subsequent steps by game theoretical analyses.
Keywords: trust management, reputation system, game theory, and rationality.
1 Introduction
The primary purpose of a trust model is to continuously measure the trustworthiness
of a set of entities (e.g., servers, sellers, agents, nodes, robots, players, etc) based on
their behaviors. Indeed, scientists across various disciplines have conducted research
on trust over decades and produced fascinating discoveries, however, there is not only a
huge gap among findings in these research communities but also these discoveries have
not been properly formalized to have a better understanding of the notion of trust, and
consequently, practical computational models of trust. We therefore intend to look at
the problem of trust modeling from an interdisciplinary perspective that is more realistic
and closer to human comprehension of trust.
From a social science perspective, trust is the willingness of a person to become
vulnerable to the actions of another person irrespective of the ability to control those
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2actions [1]. However, in the computer science community, trust is defined as a personal
expectation that a player has with respect to the future behavior of another party, i.e.,
a personal quantity measured to help the players in their future dyadic encounters. On
the other hand, reputation is the perception that a player has with respect to another
player’s intention, i.e., a social quantity computed based on the actions of a given player
and observations made by other parties in an electronic community that consists of
interacting parties such as people or businesses [2].
From another perspective [3], trust is made up of underlying beliefs and it is a
function based on the values of these beliefs. Similarly, reputation is a social notion
of trust. In our lives, we each maintain a set of reputation values for people we know.
Furthermore, when we decide to establish an interaction with a new person, we may
ask other people to provide recommendations regarding the new party. Based on the
information we gather, we form an opinion about the reputation of the new person. This
decentralized method of reputation measurement is called referral chain. Trust can be
also created based on both local and/or social evidence. In the former case, trust is built
through direct observations of a player whereas, in the latter case, it is built through
information from other parties. It is worth mentioning that a player can gain or lose her
reputation not only because of her cooperation/defection in a specific setting but also
based on the ability to produce accurate referrals.
Generally speaking, the goal of reputation systems is to collect, distribute and aggre-
gate feedback about participants’ past behavior. These systems address the development
of reputation by recording the behavior of the parties, e.g., in e-commerce, the model
of reputation is constructed from a buying agent’s positive or negative past experiences
with the goal of predicting how satisfied a buying agent will be in future interactions
with a selling agent. The ultimate goal is to help the players decide whom to trust and
to detect dishonest or compromised parties in a system [4]. There exist many fasci-
nating applications of trust models and reputation systems in various engineering and
computer science disciplines.
In fact, trust models are widely used in scientific and engineering disciplines such
as electronic commerce [5,6,7,8,9,10], computer security and rational cryptography
[11,12,13,14,15,16], vehicular ad-hoc networks [17,18], social & semantic web [19,20],
multiagent systems [21,22,23], robotics and autonomous systems [24,25], game theory
and economics [26,27]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature on rational
trust modeling, that is, using game theory during the construction of a trust model. Note
that game theoretic models have been used for management and analyses of trust-based
systems [28,29].
1.1 Our Motivation and Contribution
As our motivation, we intend to provide a new mechanism for trust modeling by which:
1. The trust model incentivizes trustworthiness in the first place, i.e., self-enforcing.
2. The model is naturally resistant to attacks on trust models, i.e., resistant.
We therefore introduce the novel notion of rational trust modeling by bridging trust
management and game theory. We would like to emphasize that trust models have been
3used in game theory for a long time, for instance, in repeated games to incentivize the
players to be cooperative and not to deviate from the game’s protocol. However, game
theory has not been utilized in the process of trust model construction; in fact, this is
the novelty of our proposed approach.
In our setting, the designer of a trust model assumes that the players who intend to
utilize the model are rational/selfish meaning that they cooperate to become trustworthy
or defect otherwise based on the utility (to be defined by the trust model) that they can
gain, which is a reasonable and standard assumption. In other words, the players are
incentivized (or penalized) by the model itself to act properly. The problem of trust
modeling can be then approached by strategic games among the players using utility
functions and solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium.
Although rationality might be built-in in some existing trust models, we formalize
the notion of rational trust modeling from the model designer’s perspective. This ap-
proach results in two fascinating outcomes. First of all, the designer of a trust model can
incentivize trustworthiness in the first place by incorporating proper parameters into the
trust function, which can be later utilized among selfish players in strategic trust-based
interactions (e.g., e-commerce scenarios between sellers and buyers). Furthermore, us-
ing a rational trust model, we can prevent many well-known attacks on trust models, as
we describe later. These two prominent properties also help us to predict behavior of
the players in subsequent steps by game theoretical analyses.
1.2 Our Approach in Nutshell
Suppose there exist two sample trust functions: The first function f1(T
p−1
i ,αi) receives
the previous trust value T p−1i and the current action αi of a seller Si (i.e., cooperation
or defection) as two inputs to compute the updated trust value T pi for the next round.
However, the second function f2(T
p−1
i ,αi, `i) has an extra input value known as the
seller’s lifetime denoted by `i. Using the second trust function, a seller with a longer
lifetime will be rewarded (or penalized) more (or less) than a seller with a shorter life-
time assuming that the other two inputs (i.e., current trust value and the action) are the
same. In this scenario, “reward” means gaining a higher trust value and becoming more
trustworthy, and “penalty” means otherwise. In other words, if two sellers Si and S j both
cooperate αi = α j = C and their current trust values are equal T p−1i =T
p−1
j but their
lifetime parameters are different, for instance, `i > ` j, the seller with a higher lifetime
parameter, gains a higher trust value for the next round, i.e., T pi > T
p
j . This may help
Si to sell more items and accumulate more revenue because buyers always prefer to buy
from trustworthy sellers, i.e., sellers with a higher trust value.
Now consider a situation in which the sellers can sell defective versions of an item
with more revenue or non-defective versions of the same item with less revenue. If
we utilize the first sample trust function f1, it might be tempting for a seller to sell
defective items because he can gain more utility. Furthermore, the seller can return to
the community with a new identity (a.k.a, re-entry attack) after selling defective items
and accumulating a large revenue. However, if we use the second sample trust function
f2, it’s no longer in a seller’s best interest to sell defective items because if he returns
to the community with a new identity, his lifetime parameter becomes zero and he
4loses all the credits that he has accumulated overtime. As a result, he loses his future
customers and a huge potential revenue, i.e., buyers may prefer a seller with a longer
lifetime over a seller who is a newcomer. The second trust function not only incentivizes
trustworthiness but also prevents the re-entry attack.
Note that this is just an example of rational trust modeling for the sake of clar-
ification. The second sample function here utilizes an extra parameter `i in order to
incentivize trustworthiness and prevent the re-entry attack. In fact, different parameters
can be incorporated into trust functions based on the context (whether it’s a scenario
in e-commerce or cybersecurity and so on), and consequently, different attacks can be
prevented, as discussed in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries: Game Theory
In this section, preliminary materials regarding game-theoretic concepts are provided
for further technical discussions.
A game consists of a set of players, a set of actions and strategies (i.e., the method
of selecting actions), and finally, a utility function that is used by each player to compute
how much benefit he can gain by choosing a certain action. In cooperative games, play-
ers collaborate and split the aggregated utility among themselves, that is, cooperation is
incentivized by agreement. However, in non-cooperative games, players can not form
agreements to coordinate their behavior, that is, any cooperation must be self-enforcing.
The prisoner’s dilemma, as illustrated in Figure 1, is an example of non-cooperative
games. In this setting, two possible actions are considered: C : keep quiet (or cooper-
ation) and D : confess (or defection). In the payoff (utility) matrix, +1,0,−1, and −2
denote freedom, jail for one year, jail for two years, and jail for three years respectively.
The outcome of this game will be (D ,D) because of the Nash equilibrium concept,
while the ideal outcome is (C ,C ). To better understand the notion of Nash equilib-
rium, and consequently, why the game has such an outcome, consider the following
two possible scenarios:
1. If player P1 selects C (the first row), then player P2 will select D (the second col-
umn) since +1> 0.
2. If player P1 selects D (the second row), then player P2 will select D (the second
column) since −1>−2.
In other words, regardless of whether player P1 cooperates or defects, player P2 will
always defect. Since the payoff matrix is symmetric, player P1 will also defect regard-
less of whether P2 cooperates or defects. In fact, since the players are in two different
locations and are not able to coordinate their behavior, the final outcome will be (D ,D).
We now briefly review some well-known game-theoretic concepts and definitions
[30] for our further analysis and discussions.
Definition 1. LetA def=A1×·· ·×An be an action profile for n players, whereAi denote
the set of possible actions of player Pi. A game Γ = (Ai,ui) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, consists of
Ai and a utility function ui :A 7→ R for each player Pi. We refer to a vector of actions
a = (a1, . . . ,an) ∈A as an outcome of the game.
5-1 , -1 +1 , -2 D: Confess 
-2 , +1 0 , 0 C: Quiet 
D: Confess C: Quiet 
P2 
P1 -1 , -1 +1 , -2 
-2 , +1 0 , 0 
P1 
P1: “what if I cooperate” 
-1 , -1 +1 , -2 
-2 , +1 0 , 0 
P1 
P1: “what if I defect” 
P2 
P2 
Fig. 1. Nash Equilibrium in Prisoner’s Dilemma
Definition 2. The utility function ui illustrates the preferences of player Pi over differ-
ent outcomes. We say Pi prefers outcome a to a′ iff ui(a)> ui(a′), and he weakly prefers
outcome a to a′ if ui(a)≥ ui(a′).
To allow the players to follow randomized strategies (strategy defines how to select
actions), we define σi as a probability distribution over Ai for a player Pi. This means
that he samples ai ∈ Ai according to σi. A strategy is said to be a pure-strategy if
each σi assigns probability 1 to a certain action, otherwise, it is said to be a mixed-
strategy. Let σ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) be the vector of players’ strategies, and let (σ ′i ,σ−i)
def
=
(σ1, . . . ,σi−1,σ ′i ,σi+1, . . . ,σn), where Pi replaces σi by σ ′i and all the other players’
strategies remain unchanged. Therefore, ui(σ) denote the expected utility of Pi under
the strategy vector σ . A player’s goal is to maximize ui(σ). In the following definitions,
one can substitute an action ai ∈Ai with its probability distribution σi ∈ Si or vice versa.
Definition 3. A vector of strategies σ is Nash equilibrium if, for all i and any σ ′i 6= σi,
it holds that ui(σ ′i ,σ−i)≤ ui(σ). This means no one gains any advantage by deviating
from the protocol as long as the others follow the protocol.
Definition 4. Let S−i
def
= S1×·· ·×Si−1×Si+1×·· ·×Sn. A strategy σi ∈ Si (or an action)
is weakly dominated by a strategy σ ′i ∈ Si (or another action) with respect to S−i if:
1. For all σ−i ∈ S−i, it holds that ui(σi,σ−i)≤ ui(σ ′i ,σ−i).
2. There exists a σ−i ∈ S−i s.t. ui(σi,σ−i)< ui(σ ′i ,σ−i).
This means that Pi can never improve its utility by playing σi, and he can sometimes
improve it by not playing σi. A strategy σi ∈ Si is strictly dominated if player Pi can
always improve its utility by not playing σi.
3 Rational Trust Modeling
We stress that our goal here is not to design specific trust models or construct certain
utility functions. Our main objective is to illustrate the high-level idea of rational trust
modeling through examples/analyses without loss of generality.
3.1 Trust Modeling: Construction and Evaluation
To construct a quantifiable model of trust, a mathematical function or model for trust
measurement in a community of n players must be designed. First of all, a basic trust
function is defined as follows:
6Definition 5. LetT pi denote trust value of player Pi in period p where−1≤T pi ≤+1
and T 0i = 0 for newcomers. A trust function is a mapping from R×N to R which is
defined as follows: (T p−1i ,αi) 7→ T pi , where T p−1i denote the trust value of player
Pi in period p− 1 and αi ∈ {0,1} denote whether Pi has cooperated, i.e., αi = 1, or
defected, i.e., αi = 0, in period p.
As an example, we can refer to the following mathematical model [9,31]. In this
model, T pi = T
p−1
i + µ(x) or T
p
i = T
p−1
i − µ ′(x) for αi = 1 or αi = 0 respectively,
shown in Figure 2. Parameters η , θ and κ are used to reward or penalize players based
on their actions (for instance, as defined in [31], η = 0.01, θ = 0.05 and κ = 0.09). Note
that in [1−ε,+1] and [−1,ε−1], µ(x) and µ ′(x) both converge to zero, as required by
Definition 5, i.e., −1≤T pi ≤+1.
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Fig. 2. Trust Adjustment by µ(x) and µ ′(x)
After designing a mathematical function, it must be assessed and validated from
different perspectives for further improvement. We provide high-level descriptions of
some validation procedures to be considered for evaluation of a trust model, that is,
behavioral, adversarial and operational methodologies.
1. Behavioral: how the model performs among a sufficient number of players by run-
ning a number of standard tests, i.e., executing a sequence of “cooperation” and
“defection” (or no-participation) for each player. For instance, how fast the model
can detect defective behavior by creating a reasonable trust margin between coop-
erative and non-cooperative parties.
2. Adversarial: how vulnerable the trust model is to different attacks or any kinds of
corruption by a player or a coalition of malicious parties. Seven well-known attacks
on trust models are listed below. The first five attacks are known as single-agent
attacks and the last two are known as multi-agent or coalition attacks [32].
(a) Sybil: forging identities or creating multiple false accounts by one player.
(b) Lag: cooperating for some time to gain a high trust value and then cheat.
(c) Re-Entry: corrupted players return to the scheme using new identities.
(d) Imbalance: cooperating on cheap transactions; defecting on expensive ones.
7(e) Multi-Tactic: any combination of attacks mentioned above.
(f) Ballot-Stuffing: fake transactions among colluders to gain a high trust value.
(g) Bad-Mouthing: submitting negative reviews to non-coalition members.
3. Operational: how well the future states of trust can be predicted with a relatively
accurate approximation based on possible action(s) of the players (prediction can
help us to prevent some well-known attacks), and how well the model can incen-
tivize cooperation in the first place.
In the next section, we clarify what considerations should be taken into account by the
designer in order to construct a proper trust model that resists against various attacks
and also encourages trustworthiness in the first place.
3.2 Rational Trust Modeling Illustration: Seller’s Dilemma
We now illustrate a dilemma between two sellers by considering two different trust
functions. In this setting, each seller has defective and non-defective versions of an
item for sale. We consider the following two possible actions:
1. Cooperation: selling the non-defective version of the item for $3 to different buyers.
2. Defection: selling the defective version of the item for $2 to different buyers.
Assuming that the buyers are not aware of the existence of the defective version of
the item, they may prefer to buy from the seller who offers the lowest price. This is
a pretty natural and standard assumption. As a result, the seller who offers the lowest
price has the highest chance to sell the item, and consequently, he can gain more utility.
An appropriate payoff function can be designed for this seller’s dilemma based on
the probability of being selected by a buyer since there is a correlation between the
offered price and this probability, Figure 3. In other words, if they both offer the same
price ($2 or $3), they have an equal chance of being selected by a buyer, otherwise, the
seller who offers a lower price ($2) will be selected by the probability of 1.
0.5 , 0.5 1 , 0 D: def: $2 
0 , 1 0.5 , 0.5 C: n-def: $3 
D: def: $2 C: n-def: $3 
S2 
S1 0.5 , 0.5 1 , 0 
0 , 1 0.5 , 0.5 
S1 
S1: “what if I cooperate” 
0.5 , 0.5 1 , 0 
0 , 1 0.5 , 0.5 
S1 
S1: “what if I defect” 
S2 
S2 
Fig. 3. Seller’s Dilemma
Similar to the prisoner’s dilemma, defection is Nash equilibrium meaning that it is
in the best interest of each seller to maximize his utility by selling the defective version
of the item. For instance, suppose S1 cooperates by selling the non-defective item for
8$3, S2 will then offer the defective item for $2 to have the highest chance to sell the
item, and consequently, he can gain more utility. On the other hand, suppose S1 defects
by selling the defective item for $2, S2 will then offer the defective item for $2 to
compete with S1. That is, regardless of whether seller S1 cooperates or defects, seller
S2 will always defect, and since the payoff matrix is symmetric, defection (selling the
defective item) is always Nash equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, we now show how a proper trust model can deal with this
dilemma; note that this is just an example for the sake of clarification. We first consider
two different trust functions, as we described earlier:
1. The first function f1 : (T
p−1
i ,αi) 7→ T pi , where T p−1i denote the trust value of
seller Si in period p−1 and αi ∈ {0,1} denote whether seller Si has cooperated or
defected in the current period p.
2. The second function f2 : (T
p−1
i ,αi, `i) 7→T pi , whereT p−1i and αi ∈ {0,1} denote
the same notions as of the previous function and `i ≥ 0 denote the lifetime of seller
Si as a new input in the trust function. This parameter defines how long a seller with
a reasonable number of transactions has been in the market.
For the sake of simplicity, we didn’t consider two different parameters for the life-
time and the number of transactions, however, two separate parameters can be simply
incorporated into our trust function and we can still achieve the same game theoretical
result. The main reason is because we want to make sure the sellers who have been
in the market for a long time but have been inactive or have had a limited number of
transactions cannot obtain a high trust value, which is a reasonable assumption.
Now considering the seller’s dilemma that we illustrated in Figure 3, the first func-
tion f1 is significantly vulnerable to re-entry attack. That is, a seller Si may defect on
a sequence of transactions in the middle of his lifetime to gain substantial revenues
(utility). He can then return to the market with a new identity as a newcomer.
However, the lifetime `i is part of the second trust function f2 meaning that a seller
Si with a longer lifetime is more reliable/trustworthy from the buyers’ perspective. As
a result, he has a higher chance to be selected by the buyers, and consequently, he can
gain more utility. This is a very realistic assumption in the e-marketplace. Therefore, it’s
not in the best interest of a seller to sacrifice his lifetime indicator (and correspondingly
his trustworthiness) for a short term utility through defection and then re-entry attack.
It is not hard to show that, by using function f2 rather than function f1, “defection” is
no longer Nash equilibrium in the seller’s dilemma, as we illustrate in Section 3.3. When
we assume the sellers are rational/selfish and they decide based on their utility functions,
we can then design a proper trust function similar to f2 to incentivize cooperation in the
first place. Furthermore, we can deal with a wide range of attacks, as we mentioned
earlier. Finally, at any point, the behavior of a seller can be predicted by estimation of
his payoff through trust and utility functions.
3.3 Rational Trust Modeling: Design and Analysis
In our setting, the utility function ui :A ×Ti 7→R, which depends on the seller’s action
and his trust value. This function computes the utility that each Si gains or loses by
9selecting a certain action. If we consider the 2nd trust function f2 : (T
p−1
i ,αi, `i) 7→T pi ,
the trust value then depends on the seller’s lifetime `i as well. As a result, the lifetime
of the seller directly affects the utility that the seller can gain or lose. Now consider the
following simple utility function:
ui =Ω ×g(T pi ) where 0≤ g(T pi )≤ 1,Ω is a constant (1)
As stated earlier, we first define the following parameters, where −1 ≤ T pi ≤ +1 and
αi ∈ {0,1} denote whether Si has cooperated or defected in the previous period:
τi =T pi −T p−1i where
|τi|
τi
=
{
+1 if αi = 1
−1 if αi = 0
(2)
In the following equations, the first function f1 does not depend on the seller’s
lifetime `i, however, the second function f2 has an extra factor that is defined by lifetime
`i and constants ρ . We can assume that ρ`i is in the same range as of µ depending on
the player’s lifetime; that is why `i is multiplied by multiplicative factor ρ . Also, it’s
always positive meaning that no matter if a player cooperates or defects, he will always
be rewarded by ρ`i. We stress that parameter `i in function f2 is just an examples of
how a rational trust function can be designed. The designer can simply consider various
parameters (that denote different concepts) as additive or multiplicative factors based
on the context in which the trust model is supposed to be utilized. We discuss this issue
later in Section 4 in detail.
f1 : T
p
i =T
p−1
i +
|τi|
τi
µ (3)
f2 : T
p
i =T
p−1
i +
|τi|
τi
µ+ρ`i (4)
−1 ≤ T pi ≤+1, E.g.: 0≤ µ < 0.1 is a unified function in f1 and f2
The first function f1 rewards or penalizes the sellers based on their actions and inde-
pendent of their lifetimes. This makes function f1 vulnerable to different attacks such as
the re-entry attack because a malicious seller can always come back to the scheme with
a new identity, and then, starts re-building his reputation for another malicious activity.
It is possible to make the sign-up procedure costly but it is out of the scope of this paper.
On the other hand, the second trust function f2 has an extra term that is defined
by the seller’s lifetime `i. This term will be adjusted by ρ as an additional reward or
punishment factor in the trust function. In other words, the seller’s current lifetime `i
in addition to a constant ±β (in the case of cooperation/defection) determine the extra
reward/punishment factor. As a result, it is not in the best interest of a seller to reset his
lifetime indicator `i to zero because of a short-term utility. This lifetime indicator can
increase the seller’s trustworthiness, and consequently, his long-term utility overtime.
Let assume our sample utility function is further extended as follows, where Ω is a
constant, for instance, Ω can be $100:
ui =Ω
(
T pi +1
2
)
where 0≤ T
p
i +1
2
≤ 1,−1≤T pi ≤+1 (5)
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The utility function simply indicates a seller with a higher trust value (which de-
pends on his lifetime indicator as well) can gain more utility because he has a higher
chance to be selected by the buyers. In other words, Eqn. (5) maps the current trust value
T pi to a value between zero and one, which can be also interpreted as the probability of
being selected by the buyers. For the sake of simplicity, suppose T p−1i is canceled out
in both f1 and f2 as a common factor. The overall utility U
f1
i is shown below when f1 is
used. Note that ui computes the utility of a seller in the case of cooperation or defection
whereas Ui also takes into account the external utility or future loss that a seller may
gain or lose. For instance, more savings through selling the defective version of an item
instead of its non-defective version.
U f1i =Ω ×

+µ+1
2 using f1 when αi = 1
−µ+1
2 +β using f1 when αi = 0 plus β , β is the external utility
that the seller obtains by selling the defective item
As shown in U f1i , function f1 rewards/penalizes sellers in each period by factor ± µ2 .
Accordingly, we can assume external utility β that the seller obtains by selling the
defective item is slightly more than (as much as σ ) the utility that the seller may lose
because of defection; otherwise, the seller wouldn’t defect, that is, β = µ2 + |− µ2 |+σ =
µ+σ (note that the seller not only loses a potential reward µ2 but also he is penalized
by factor − µ2 when he defects.) In other words, external utility β not only compensates
for loss µ2 + |− µ2 | but also provides additional gain σ .
As a result, −µ+12 +β =
−µ+1
2 +(µ+σ)=
µ+1
2 +σ . Therefore, Defection is always
Nash Equilibrium when f1 is used, as shown in Table 1. We can assume the seller cheats
on δ rounds until he is labeled as an untrustworthy seller. At this point, he leaves and
returns with a new identity with the same initial trust value of newcomers, i.e., re-entry
attack. Our analysis remains the same even if cheating is repeated for δ rounds.
S1
S2
C ooperation Defection
C ooperation µ+12 ,
µ+1
2
µ+1
2 ,
µ+1
2 +σ
Defection µ+12 +σ ,+
µ+1
2
µ+1
2 +σ ,
µ+1
2 +σ
Table 1. Seller’s Dilemma: Defection is always Nash Equilibrium using f1.
Similarly, function f2 rewards/penalizes sellers through U
f2
i in each period by factor
± µ2 . Furthermore, this function also has a positive reward (or forgiveness) factor ρ`i2
for cooperative (or non-cooperative) sellers, which is defined by their lifetime factors.
Likewise, we can assume external utility β that the seller obtains by selling the defective
item is slightly more than the utility that the seller may lose by defection (β = µ+σ ).
11
The overall utility U f2i will be as follows when the f2 is used:
U f2i =Ω ×

(+µ+ρ`i)+1
2 using f1 when αi = 1
(−µ+ρ`i)+1
2 +β − γ using f1 when αi = 0 plus β as before,
where γ is the future loss due to the impact of `i
Without loss of generality, suppose the seller defects, leaves and then comes back
with a new identity. As a result the lifetime index `i becomes zero. Let assume this
index is increased by the following arithmetic progression to reach to where it was:
0 , 15`i ,
2
5`i ,
3
5`i ,
4
5`i , `i. In reality, it takes a while for a seller to accumulate this credit
based on our definition, i.e., years of existence and number of transactions. Therefore,
γ ≈ ρ
2
(
(`i−0)+(`i− 15`i)+(`i−
2
5
`i)+(`i− 35`i)+(`i−
4
5
`i)+(`i− `i)
)
=
ρ
2
(
`i+
4
5
`i+
3
5
`i+
2
5
`i+
1
5
`i+0
)
=
3
2
ρ`i
E.g., (`i− 15`i) denote the lifetime could be `i, or even more, but it’s now 15`i meaning
that the seller is losing 45`i, and so on. We now simplify the U
f2
i when αi = 0 as follows:
U f2i :
(−µ+ρ`i)+1
2
+β − γ
=
(−µ+ρ`i)+1
2
+µ+σ − 3
2
ρ`i =
Ψ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(+µ+ρ`i)+1
2
+σ − 3
2
ρ`i
This is a simple but interesting result that shows, as long as 32ρ`i > σ , C ooperation
is always Nash Equilibrium when f2 is used, Table 2. In other words, as long as future
loss γ is greater than the short-term gain through defection, it’s not in the best interest of
the seller to cheat and commit to the re-entry attack, that is, the seller may gain a small
short-term utility by cheating, however, he loses a larger long-term utility because it
takes a while to reach to `i from 0. The analysis will be the same if the seller cheats on
δ rounds before committing to the re-entry attack as long as the future loss is greater
than the short-term gain. In fact, the role of parameter `i is to make the future loss costly.
S1
S2
C ooperation Defection
C ooperation Ψ ,Ψ Ψ ,Ψ +σ − 32ρ`i
Defection Ψ +σ − 32ρ`i ,Ψ Ψ +σ − 32ρ`i ,Ψ +σ − 32ρ`i
Table 2. Seller’s Dilemma: C ooperation is always NE using f2 when 32ρ`i > σ .
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4 Technical Analysis and Discussion
As stated earlier, we would like to emphasize that our intention here was not to design
specific trust models, construct utility functions (which is hard in many cases), target
a certain set of attacks, or focus on particular assumptions/games/dilemmas. Our main
objective was to illustrate the high-level idea of rational trust modeling by some exam-
ples and analyses without loss of generality. The presented models, functions, dilemma
scenarios, attack strategies, assumptions and parameters can be modified as long as the
model designers utilize the technical approach and strategy of rational trust modeling.
As we illustrated, by designing a proper trust function and using a game-theoretical
analysis, not only trustworthiness can be incentivized but also well-known attacks on
trust functions can be prevented, such as re-entry attack in our example. Furthermore,
behavior of the players can be predicted by estimating the utility that each player may
gain. In this section, we further discuss on these issues while focusing on other types of
attacks against trust models. As shown in Table 3, all single-agent attacks can be simply
prevented if the designer of the model incorporates one or more extra parameters (in
addition to the previous trust value T p−1i and the current action αi) into the function.
Attacks Parameter Description
Sybil Total number of Prevent the players to create
Past Transactions multiple false accounts
Lag High Prevent the players to cheat
Expectancy after gaining a high trust value
Re-Entry Lifetime Prevent the players to return
of the Player with a new identity
Imbalance Transaction Prevent the players to cheat
Cost on expensive transactions
Multi Tactic Combination of Prevent the players to defect
Parameters in various circumstances
Table 3. Sample Parameters: To deal with single-agent attacks.
For instance, to deal with the Sybil attack, we can consider a parameter that only
reflects the total number of past transactions. In that case, it’s not in the best interest of
a player to create multiple accounts and divides his total number of transactions among
different identities. For imbalance attack, we can consider a parameter for transaction
cost, i.e., if the player defects on an expensive transaction, his trust value declines with
much faster ratio. For other attacks and their corresponding parameters, see Table 3.
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It is worth mentioning that when the trust value reaches to the saturated region, e.g.,
very close to +1, a player may not have any interest to accumulate more trust credits.
However, in this situation, the high expectancy parameter (as shown in Table 3) can be
simply utilized in the trust function to warn the fully trusted players that they can sustain
this credibility as long as they remain reliable, and if they commit to defections, they
will be negatively and significantly (more than others) affected due to high expectancy.
Similarly, we can consider more complicated parameters to incentivize the players
not to collude, and consequently, deal with multi-agent/coalition attacks. It is also worth
mentioning that consideration should be given to the context in which the trust model
is supposed to be used. Some of these parameters are context-oriented and the designer
of the model should take this fact into account when designing a rational trust function.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, the novel notion of rational trust modeling was introduced by bridging
trust management and game theory. In our proposed setting, the designer of a trust
model assumes that the players who intend to utilize the model are rational/selfish, i.e.,
they decide to become trustworthy or untrustworthy based on the utility that they can
gain. In other words, the players are incentivized (or penalized) by the model itself to
act properly. The problem of trust management can be then approached by strategic
games among the players using utility functions and solution concepts such as NE.
Our approach resulted in two fascinating outcomes. First of all, the designer of a
trust model can incentivize trustworthiness in the first place by incorporating proper
parameters into the trust function. Furthermore, using a rational trust model, we can
prevent many well-known attacks on trust models. These prominent properties also
help us to predict the behavior of the players in subsequent steps by game theoretical
analyses. As our final remark, we would like to emphasize that our rational trust model-
ing approach can be extended to any mathematical modeling where some sorts of utility
and/or rationality are involved.
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